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FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS-WASHINGTON CONDITIONS MEDIA
ACCESS TO THE COURTROOM-Federated Publications, Inc. v. Swed-
berg, 96 Wn. 2d 13, 633 P.2d 74 (1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2257
(1982).
In Federated Publications, Inc. v. Swedberg, ' the Washington Su-
preme Court held that a trial court could impose "reasonable conditions"
on press attendance at a pretrial suppression hearing. 2
During a prosecution for attempted murder,3 the trial judge determined
that detailed reporting of the pretrial suppression hearing would jeopar-
dize the defendant's right to a fair trial. Judge Swedberg therefore condi-
tioned the media's attendance on their agreement to abide by the 1974
Washington State Bench-Bar-Press Guidelines. 4
Federated Publications, publisher of the Bellingham Herald, refused to
sign the agreement and refused to allow its reporters to attend solely in a
nonprofessional capacity. 5 It argued that conditioning media attendance
on compliance with the Bench-Bar-Press Guidelines constituted a prior
restraint and that the trial judge exceeded his power by excluding non-
signing media representatives. 6 The Washington Supreme Court dis-
agreed, holding that the order was a permissible access restriction.
This Note first examines the legal background of the doctrine of prior
restraint, access to the courtroom, and the development of the Bench-Bar-
Press Guidelines. It argues that the Washington Supreme Court errone-
ously characterized the trial court's order as an access restriction instead
of a prior restraint. Finally, this Note proposes an alternative approach for
situations where the trial court faces a substantial likelihood of prejudicial
publicity. This alternative approach suggests that procedural safeguards
should be exhausted before the trial court imposes any access restrictions.
I. 96Wn. 2d 13, 633P.2d74(1981), cert. denied, 102S. Ct. 2257(1982).
2. Id. at 22,633 P.2d at 78.
3. The defendant was Veronica Compton, who proclaimed herself to be the girlfriend of Kenneth
Bianchi, the "Hillside Strangler." Both Compton's and Bianchi's alleged crimes were the subjects of
extensive publicity. Id. at 15,633 P.2d at 74; State v. Bianchi, 92 Wn. 2d 91,593 P.2d 1330 (1979).
4. 96 Wn. 2d at 15, 633 P.2d at 75. The Bench-Bar-Press Guidelines are a voluntary code of
conduct to guide the bench, bar, and press in reporting various proceedings. STATEMENT OF PRINCI-
PLES AND GUIDELINES OF THE BENCH-BAR-PRSS COMMrIrEE OF WASHINGTON 1 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as BENcH-BAR-PRESS GUIDELINES]. See discussion at § 1B3 infra.
5. 96 Wn. 2d at 15, 633 P.2d at 75.
6. Id. at 18, 633 P.2d at 76.
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I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The fair trial-free press conflict 7 is rooted in the need to preserve the
defendant's sixth amendment 8 right to an impartial jury while providing
the public with access to and information about criminal proceedings.
Public access is constitutionally mandated in certain circumstances. 9 The
first amendmentl 0 requires courts to allow the media to report on proceed-
ings, once access is granted.II Nevertheless, the defendant's interests are
also important and, often, constitutionally protected. One protected inter-
est is the right to an impartial jury. 12 Extensive publication of prejudicial
information may result in the impanelling of biased jurors, the denial of
due process, and the consequent need to reverse convictions. 1 3
7. The fair trial-free press conflict has been the subject of extensive commentary. See, e.g.. A.
FRIENDLY & R. GOLDFARB, CRIME AND PUBLICITY (1967): TIlE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK
FORCE ON JUSTICE. PUBLICITY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT. RIGHTS IN CONFLICT ( 976): Stephenson.
Fair Trial-Free Press: Rights in Continuing Conflict, 46 BROOKLYN L. RE%, 39 (1979). For a bib-
liography of literature on the fair trial-free press conflict, see D. FRErrZ. COURTS AND THE NFwS MEDIA
139-43 (1977).
8. The sixth amendment states in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed. ... U.S. CONST amend. VI.
9. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 102 S. Ct. 2613 (1982): Richmond Newspapers
v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); see also text accompanying notes 17-26 infra.
10. "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press
.. "U.S. CONST amend. 1.
I1. See Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (order prohibiting pub-
lication of name and picture of juvenile obtained during open hearing violated first amendment):
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 549, 568 (1976) (order prohibiting publication of evidence
offered at an open preliminary hearing violated "settled [first amendment] principles"); Craig v.
Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947) ("What transpires in the court room is public property . . .
Those who see and hear what transpired can report it with impunity."); State ex rel. Superior Court
v. Sperry, 79 Wn. 2d 69, 483 P.2d 608, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971). See also Cox Broadcast-
ing Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (state could not impose sanctions on the press for publica-
tion of rape victim's name that was discovered in public court records).
12. SeeU.S. CONST amend. VI.
13. Early U.S. Supreme Court cases upheld convictions despite extensive publicity. E.g.. Stro-
ble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952). Stroble involved widespread pretrial publicity including the
district attorney's release of a confession and public announcement that the defendant was guilty and
sane. The Court refused to find a due process violation in the absence of a showing of actual preju-
dice. Id. at 198. Cf. Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963) (the Court found a denial of due
process without a finding of actual prejudice when the trial judge refused to grant a change of venue
following broadcast of an "interview" in which the defendant confessed to the sheriff).
The Supreme Court has reversed convictions, however, when pretrial publicity resulted in actual
prejudice. In Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959), the Court set aside a federal conviction
because of prejudicial publicity that occurred when seven jurors saw published reports of the defen-
dant's prior convictions. Two years later the Court for the first time overturned a state conviction
because of prejudicial publicity. In Irvin v. Dowd, J66 U.S. 717 (1961). pretrial publicity resulted in
eight of twelve jurors stating during voir dire that they thought the defendant was guilty. The Court
stated that the standard for determining jury impartiality required only that the juror be able to "lay
aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court." Id. at
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Several means are available to protect a defendant's right to a fair trial
from possibly prejudicial publicity. Courts may control judicial proceed-
ings by closing pretrial hearings, changing venue, conducting intensive
voir dire, and imposing "gag orders" 14 to limit comments by attorneys,
court personnel, and law enforcement officials. 15 Courts may also control
publication of information by contempt proceedings and possibly, under
current doctrine, by prior restraints. 16 The media may restrict its own
publication by adhering to voluntary guidelines. The following section
examines the utility, practicality, and constitutionality of access restric-
tions, prior restraints, and voluntary guidelines.
A. Controlling Access to the Proceedings
Closing pretrial proceedings prevents dissemination of potentially
prejudicial information. The United States Supreme Court considered the
right of the public' 7 to attend judicial proceedings in Gannett Co. v. De-
722-23. The Court found that this standard had not been met because of the "continued adverse
publicity" before trial. Id. at 726. See also Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (holding that
prejudicial publicity prevented a fair trial).
Further enunciation of the standard for jury impartiality came in Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794
(1975), in which the Court affirmed a conviction despite extensive pretrial publicity. The Court,
quoting Irvin, stated that the defendant must show an "actual existence of such an opinion in the
mind of the juror as will raise the presumption of partiality." Id. at 800 (quoting Irvin v. Dowd, 336
U.S. 717, 723 (1961)). Cf. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) (televising of proceedings denied
defendant due process). But cf. Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981) (televising of proceedings
did not, by itself, deny defendant due process).
The Court has recently declined to review claims of denial of fair trials resulting from prejudicial
publicity. See The News Media and the Law, Feb.-Mar. 1982, at 39-40. For a review of the Su-
preme Court's treatment of prejudicial publicity claims, see Portman, The Defense of Fair Trialfrom
Sheppard to Nebraska Press Association: Benign Neglect to Affirmative Action and Beyond, 29 STAN.
L. REv. 393 (1977); Stephenson, supra note 7.
14. "Gag orders" have been attacked as violating free speech rights. See, e.g., Gulf Oil v.
Bernard, 452 U.S. 89 (198 t) (trial court abused its discretion in'issuing an order limiting communica-
tions between attorneys and potential class members); Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356 (4th Cir.
1979) (en banc) (disciplinary rule limiting attorneys' comments upheld in part); Chicago Council of
Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 249 (7th Cir. 1975) (disciplinary rule limiting attorneys' comments
must incorporate "serious and imminent threat of interference with the fair administration of justice"
standard), cert. denied sub nom. Cunningham v. Chicago Council of Lawyers, 427 U.S. 912 (1976);
Markfield v. Ass'n of Bar of New York, 49 A.D.2d 516, 370 N.Y.S.2d 82, 85 (1975) (disciplinary
rule limiting attorneys' comments during criminal trials must incorporate "clear and present danger
to the administration of justice" standard); Widoff v. Disciplinary Bd., 54 Pa. Commw. 124, 420
A.2d 41 (1980) (disciplinary rule limiting attorneys' comments during pendency of administrative
hearing held unconstitutional). Analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this Note.
15. A trial judge could also use a continuance, a severance, peremptory challenges, sequestration
and admonitions to the jury to protect the defendant from prejudicial publicity.
16. See discussion at § IB1 infra.
17. The press has no greater right of access than the public. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438
U.S. 1, 16 (1978) (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion); id. at 16-17 (Stewart, J., concurring in the
judgment) (press must be granted "effective" access); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843,
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Pasquale, 18 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 19 and Globe News-
paper Co. v. Superior Court.20
In Gannett, the Court held that the public has no sixth amendment right
of access to pretrial suppression hearings, reasoning that only the accused
can assert the sixth amendment right to a public trial. 21 Gannett generated
confusion because the majority opinion failed to distinguish clearly be-
tween pretrial proceedings and trials. Clarifying this point in Richmond
Newspapers, the Court recognized a first amendment right of access to
criminal trials. 22
In Globe Newspaper, decided after Swedberg, the Court held that a
Massachusetts law requiring mandatory closure of sex-offense trials dur-
ing the testimony of a minor victim was unconstitutional. 23 The Court
850 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 835 (1974). Pell and Sarbe involved challenges to rules
prohibiting media interviews with prisoners. The Court held that because the press was not denied
information available to the public, the first amendment was not violated. Justice Powell, dissenting
in both cases, argued in Saxbe that "[t]he press . . . acts as an agent of the public at large. It is the
means by which the people receive that free flow of information and ideas essential to intelligent self-
government." 417 U.S. at 863.
In Houchins, KQED sued for access to a jail to investigate allegedly shocking conditions.
Houchins, the county sheriff, then instituted a monthly tour program limited to groups of 25 persons
but prohibited pictures and inmate interviews. The district court granted a preliminary injunction
enjoining Houchins from denying the press reasonable access to the jail and from prohibiting inmate
interviews. The court of appeals affirmed. In a plurality opinion, the Supreme Court reversed. Three
justices followed the majority's position in Pell and Saxbe. Justice Stevens argued in dissent that
although the press has no greater right of access than the public, the injunction was valid because the
jail's no-access policy probably violated the first amendment. Houchins, 438 U.S. at 19. Justice
Stewart, concurring in the judgment, asserted that the press has "equal access" with the public, but
that "the concept of equal access must be accorded more flexibility in order to accommodate the
practical distinctions between the press and the general public." Id. at 16. Thus, the injunction was
justified, according to Justice Stewart, insofar as it granted the press more flexible and frequent ac-
cess and permitted the press to bring cameras into the jail. Id. at 18.
18. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
19. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
20. 102 S. Ct. 2613, 2619-20 (1982).
21. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, argued that even if the sixth amendment established
a fight of access, that right would not extend to pretrial proceedings. These proceedings were tradi-
tionally private and often serve to prevent the jury from hearing inadmissible evidence. 443 U.S. at
387-89. Justice Burger, concurring, emphasized the pretrial nature of the proceedings, and asserted
that there was no sixth amendment right because pretrial proceedings were not open at common law.
Id. at 396.
22. 448 U.S. 555 (1980). The justices filed seven separate opinions in Richmond Newspapers.
Only Justice Rehnquist dissented. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of the
case.
23. 102 S. Ct. 2613 (1982). Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment, stating that she inter-
preted both Richmond Newspapers and Globe Newspaper to be limited to the context of criminal
trials. Id. at 2623 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justice Rehnquist,
dissented, arguing that rape trials were historically closed, and that the state's interests overrode the
"incidental effects of the law on First Amendment rights." Id. at 2625 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens also dissented, stating that the appeal should have been dismissed because the contro-
versy lacked concreteness and was premature. Id. at 2623 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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declared that a state seeking to deny access "in order to inhibit the disclo-
sure of sensitive information" 24 must show "that the denial is necessi-
tated by a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to
serve that interest." 25 The trial court, in considering closure, must make
a case-by-case determination of necessity, and must provide the public
and press with an opportunity to be heard.2 6
These Supreme Court decisions do not address the existence of a first
amendment right to attend pretrial hearings. 27 In Richmond Newspapers,
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Brennan analyzed the access issue by
asking whether the proceeding was "traditionally open to the public.' '28
Similarly, in Globe Newspaper, Justice Brennan stated that the historical
presumption of open criminal trials is an important reason supporting a
first amendment right of access to trials. 29 And, in Gannett, both Justices
Stewart and Burger indicated that pretrial hearings would not be treated
like trials because pretrial proceedings were.not open at common law. 30
24. Id. at 2620. Globe Newspaper involved a minor victim's testimony rather than prejudicial
publicity. It seems, however, that prejudicial information revealed at a pretrial hearing or a criminal
trial could also be considered "sensitive."
25. Id.
26. Id. at 2621. The state interests asserted were protecting minor victims from further trauma
and encouraging victims to come forward and testify. The Court found the former interest compelling
but the latter speculative. Though the protection of minors was a compelling interest, the Court held
that the interest could be served by a case-by-case determination of the propriety of closure. Id.
27. According to one scholar, a majority of the Court appears to support a right of access to
pretrial proceedings. Four justices dissenting in Gannett supported this right under the sixth amend-
ment. 443 U.S. 368, 406-07 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined
by Brennan, J., White, J., and Marshall, J.). Justice Stevens characterized the first amendment right
of access broadly in Richmond Newspapers, indicating his support for a right of access to pretrial
proceedings. 448 U.S. 555, 582-84 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (first amend-
ment "protects the public and the press from abridgement of their rights of access to information
about the operation of their government"). See 2 J. CHOPER, Y. KAMISAR, & L. TRIBE, THE SUPREME
COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTs 1979-1980, at 148-53 (1981).
28. 448 U.S. at 577 (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion); id. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring in the
judgment). Justices Stewart and Blackmun also emphasized history in their discussions. Id. at 599
(Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 601 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
29. 102 S. Ct. at 2619. Chief Justice Burger, dissenting in Globe Newspaper, stated that the
majority was ignoring the "traditionally open to the public" test. Id. at 2624 (Burger, C.J., dissent-
ing).
30. See note 21 supra. Because most modem pretrial proceedings did not exist at common law,
historical reliance may be inappropriate in this context. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S.
368, 437 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Historical reliance should
not be dispositive because values change and historical facts are easily manipulated. The Supreme
Court 1978 Term, 93 HARv. L. REv. 62, 67 (1979).
In Gannett, Justice Blackmun argued that suppression hearings should be open because they func-
tion like trials and often determine the outcome at trial. 443 U.S. at 434. The argument that open
proceedings promote impartiality and the fair administration of justice applies to pretrial proceedings
as well as to trials. Id. at 437. Other reasons support a right of access to pretrial proceedings. First,
the pretrial hearing has become a vital part of the criminal prosecution because of the exclusionary
rule. Second, the tradition of open trials indicates that the public has a compelling interest in observ-
Washington Law Review
While Justice Brennan emphasized the narrowness of the court's hold-
ing in Globe Newspaper,31 his opinion contains broad language regarding
the purpose and implementation of the right of access to criminal trials.
He stated, for example, that the first amendment right of access ensures
an informed discussion of governmental affairs, "enhances the quality
and safeguards the integrity of the factfinding process, . . .fosters an
appearance of fairness, . . . [and] permits the public to participate in
and serve as a check upon the judicial process." 32 Further, Justice Bren-
nan stated that a court must determine the constitutionality of an access
restriction by weighing the state interests asserted, not by assessing any
historical presumption of openness. 33 Thus, while Justice Brennan em-
phasized the limitation of the opinion to criminal trials and reiterated the
historical rationale for the right of access, his discussion of additional
rationales arguably applies to pretrial hearings, and the test of constitu-
tionality focuses on state interests rather than on history.
The right of access may also be controlled by state laws, including con-
stitutional provisions. In Federated Publications, Inc. v. Kurtz,34 the
Washington Supreme Court found that the public has a qualified right of
access to all judicial proceedings. The court based this right on article 1,
section 10 of the Washington Constitution, which provides that "[j justice
in all cases shall be administered openly .... ,35 Nevertheless, the
court upheld closure of a pretrial suppression hearing, reasoning that the
public's right of access is "not absolute." 36 Kurtz provides Washington
precedent for closure when the public's right of access conflicts with the
defendant's fight to a fair trial.
ing the administration of justice, an interest that also exists at the pretrial stage. See Note, Access to
Judicial Proceedings: After Gannett and Richmond, 12 TEX TECH L. REv. 663, 693 (1981).
Lower courts have divided on the scope of the public's right of access to pretrial hearings. E.g.,
San Jose Mercury-News v. Municipal Court, 30 Cal. 3d 498, 638 P.2d 655. 179 Cal. Rptr. 772
(1982) (closure of pretrial hearing upheld); United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. App.
1981) (pretrial closure violated first amendment); Capital Newspapers v. Clyne, 82 A.D.2d 963, 440
N.Y.S.2d 779 (1981) (proscriptions against closure held inapplicable to hearing on scope of cross-
examination about defendant's prior crimes; different considerations would apply to suppression
hearings where the public usually has a legitimate interest in attending); Commonwealth v. Hayes.
489 Pa. 419, 414 A.2d 318 (pretrial suppression hearing opened when defendant's rights could be
protected by selecting and sequestering jury prior to hearing), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 992 (1980). See
generally The Neivs Media and the Law, Feb.-Mar. 1982, at 37-38 (discussing closure cases).
31. 102 S. Ct. at 2622 n.27.
32. Id. at 2620. See note 30 supra (discussing Justice Blackmun's opinion in Gannett).
33. Globe Newspaper, 102S. Ct. at 2619 n.13.
34. 94 Wn. 2d 51,615 P.2d 440 (1980).
35. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 10 states: "Justice in all cases shall be administered openly, and
without unnecessary delay." A number of other states have identical or similar constitutional clauses.
E.g., ARIZ. CONST, art. II, § 11; PA. CONST art. I, § 11.
36. 94 Wn. 2d at 60, 615 P.2d at 445. See also Cohen v. Everett City Council, 85 Wn. 2d 385,
Vol. 57:759, 1982
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In Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa,37 decided after Swedberg, the Wash-
ington court embellished the procedure set forth in Kurtz for determining
the propriety of access restrictions. 38 The court noted five elements: (1)
the proponent must show a "likelihood of jeopardy" to the defendant's
right to a fair trial; 39 (2) all opponents must be given an opportunity to
object; (3) the court must determine that curtailing access is the least re-
strictive means available and that it effectively protects the threatened in-
terests;40 (4) " '[t]he court must weigh the competing interests of the de-
fendant and the public' '41 and articulate its findings; (5) if a closure
order is issued, it" 'must be no broader in its application or duration than
necessary to serve its purpose ..... ' ",42
B. Controlling the Printing ofNews About the Proceedings
1. Prior Restraints
A prior restraint prohibits the publication of information already in the
publisher's possession. The doctrine of prior restraint limits restriction of
publication. 43 The focus of the doctrine is temporal: prior restraints are
535 P.2d 801 (1975) (judicial proceedings must be open absent exceptional circumstances); In re
Lewis, 51 Wn. 2d 193, 316 P.2d 907 (1957) (closure of juvenile proceeding upheld).
37. 97 Wn. 2d 30, 640 P.2d 716 (1982). Ishikawa involved a challenge to the closure and sealing
of the record of a pretrial hearing. The action arose out of the prosecution of Cynthia Marler for the
murder of Wanda Touchstone. The trial judge sealed the record of a pretrial hearing, stating that the
action was necessary to protect the defendant's fair trial rights, the ongoing investigation of the mur-
der, and the safety of witnesses. Id. at 40, 640 P.2d at 721. The record, which was sealed on Febru-
ary 25, 198 1, was opened on May 19, 1982. It contained the defendant's confession and statement to
the police concerning who hired her to murder Touchstone. See Suffia, Facts of Touchstone Murder
'Remain Marler's Secret, Seattle Times, May 20, 1982, at A 11, col. I.
38. 97 Wn. 2d at 37-39,640 P.2d at 720-21.
39. Id. at 37, 640 P.2d at 720.(quoting Federated Publications, Inc. v. Kurtz, 94 Wn. 2d 51, 62,
615 P.2d 440, 446 (1980)). The court explained, "If closure and/or sealing is sought to further any
right or interest besides the defendant's right to a fair trial, a 'serious and imminent threat to some
other important interest' must be shown. . . . [A]n in camera hearing may be proper when the very
argument on closure may jeopardize the defendant's right to a fair trial." Id. at 37, 39, 640 P.2d at
720, 721.
40. Where access limitations are requested to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial, the
burden of suggesting alternatives is on the opposition. Id. at 38,640 P.2d at 721.
41. Id. (quoting Kurtz, 94 Wn. 2d at 64, 615 P.2d at 447).
42. Id. at 39, 640 P.2d at 721 (quoting Kurtz, 94 Wn. 2d at 64, 615 P.2d at 447).
43. See Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 648 (1955).
The historical setting of the doctrine lies in the licensing system adopted in England in the seven-
teenth century. Under the Licensing Act of 1662, no book or pamphlet could be published without
prior government approval. Id. at 650; 2 J. STEPHEN, A HIsToRY oFTHE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND
309 (1883). The first amendment, ratified in 1791, was designed in part to prevent the imposition of
any system of prior restraint. Emerson, supra, at 652. The Supreme Court has also recognized a
number of other purposes of the first amendment. E.g., Whitney v. California; 274 U.S. 357, 375
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considered especially repugnant because they restrict expression before
publication. Publication of information in the media's control cannot be
barred except under extraordinary circumstances. 44 A prior restraint is
distinct from controlling access to information in the first instance and
from imposing punishment after publication. By controlling access, the
government denies the media possession of information. By imposing
subsequent punishment, the government penalizes publication of infor-
mation but does not control the content of that publication.
The seminal case on prior restraint in the fair trial-free press context is
Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart.45 In Nebraska Press, the United
States Supreme Court held unconstitutional a restrictive order prohibiting
the publication of any confession made by the defendant and any "other
facts 'strongly implicative' of the accused.' '46 Chief Justice Burger, writ-
ing for the majority, stated that "any prior restraint on expression comes
to the Court with a 'heavy presumption' against its constitutional valid-
ity.'' 47
To determine the validity of the restrictive order, Burger asked whether
"the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (freedom of speech necessary for "discovery and spread of political
truth").
Both courts and commentators have expounded various rationales for the condemnation of prior
restraints. E.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) (unlike criminal penalties
and civil judgments, prior restraints are an "immediate and irreversible sanction"): Pittsburgh Press
Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 390 (1973) (communication is sup-
pressed by a prior restraint before an adequate determination that the speech is unprotected by the first
amendment): L. TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-31 at 725 (1978) (prior restraints al-
low the government to destroy the immediacy of the speech and override the publisher's decision of
what is newsworthy).
44. Modem prior restraint doctrine is rooted in the Supreme Court's decision in Near v. Minne-
sota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). In Near, the Court held unconstitutional a statute providing
for abatement, as a public nuisance, of any defamatory or scandalous newspaper. Id. at 722. The
Court stated that the first amendment, intended to prevent the imposition of any system of prior
restraint, was limited only in "'exceptional circumstances": those involving military secrets, obscene
publications, and incitements to violence. Id. at 716.
45. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
46. Id. at 545. See also Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court, 101 Ariz. 257, 418 P.2d
594 (1966) (order prohibiting publication of information divulged during open proceeding held in-
valid): Sun Co. of San Bemardino v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. App. 3d 815, 105 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1973)
(order prohibiting publication of names and photographs of prisoners scheduled to be called as prose-
cution witnesses in a murder trial held invalid); Keene Publishing Corp. v. Cheshire County Superior
Court, 119 N.H. 710, 406 A.2d 137 (1979) (order requiring counsel for newspaper publisher to
attend pretrial hearing to advise client concerning what information could be published held invalid):
State ex rel. Superior Court v. Sperry, 79 Wn. 2d 69, 483 P.2d 608 (order prohibiting publication of
information divulged in open court outside presence of jury held invalid), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939
(1971).
47. 427 U.S. at 558 (quoting Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971)).
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invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.' "48 In apply-
ing this test, Burger examined (1) the nature and extent of pretrial news
coverage, (2) the probability that other measures would mitigate the ef-
fects of unrestrained pretrial publicity, and (3) the likelihood that a re-
straining order would prevent the threatened danger. 49 The Court found
the restrictive order invalid under these criteria. 50 The Court also stated
that by prohibiting the reporting of evidence adduced at the open prelimi-
nary hearing, the order plainly violated settled principles allowing the
media to report on any events which occur in an open proceeding. 51
2. Contempt and Collateral Bar
Contempt power becomes important in the fair trial-free press conflict
when a court issues an order restricting publication of certain information
concerning a judicial proceeding. If the information is published, the pub-
lisher may be held in contempt of court. 52
The likelihood of contempt is increased by the collateral bar rule. Un-
der this rule, a court order must be obeyed until it is set aside. Violators
cannot defend themselves in contempt proceedings by arguing that the
order was erroneous or unconstitutional. 53 Thus, a publisher faced with a
48. Id. at 562. This language was the test used by Judge Learned Hand in United States v.
Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), affd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
49. 427 U.S. at 562.
50. Id. at 563. The Court found that the extent of publicity was extremely speculative. Id. The
availability of alternative remedies such as change of venue, postponement of trial, voir dire, and jury
admonitions had not been adequately addressed by the trial judge. Id. at 565. Finally, the efficacy of
the restrictive order was difficult to predict. Id. at 567.
51. Id. at 568. See note 11 supra (discussing media's freedom to publish information divulged
during open court proceeding).
52. The British solution to the problem of prejudicial publicity is the broad use of contempt
power. A. FRIENDLY & R. GOLDFARB, supra note 7, at 141; Evans, British Law of Contempt Thwarts
Speech and Justice, 52 FLA. B.J. 462 (1978). It can be invoked whenever there is a "reasonable
tendency that the administration of justice will be impaired." Gillmor, Free Press and Fair Trial in
English Law, 22 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 17 (1965). This general contempt power does not require the
existence of a court order. Occurrences in the courtroom may be freely reported, but any commentary
on the proceedings is punishable. Id. at 23 n.18. Contempt is a criminal offense, subject to summary
jurisdiction with a discretionary penalty. As a result, publication of pretrial news is practically nonex-
istent. Evans, supra, at 463.
In Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941), the United States Supreme Court held that out-of-
court publications were governed by the "clear and present danger" standard for purposes of deter-
mining the permissible use of the contempt power. To find a clear and present danger to the adminis-
tration ofjustice and a valid basis for contempt, the "substantive evil must be extremely serious and
the degree of imminence extremely high." Id. at 263. See also Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375
(1972) (same); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947) (same); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331,
347 (1946) ("For circumstances to create a clear and present danger to judicial administration, a
solidity of evidence should be required .... ").
53. See Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967). Although the United States Supreme
Court upheld the collateral bar rule in Walker, it indicated that a "transparently invalid" order could
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restrictive order has three alternatives: comply and accept the suppres-
sion; obey and appeal the order and lose the timely value of the news;
disobey the order and face a contempt proceeding without the defense of
error or unconstitutionality.
The Washington Supreme Court refused to apply the collateral bar rule
to restrictive orders prohibiting the publication of information about a ju-
dicial proceeding in State ex rel. Superior Court v. Sperrn. 54 In Sperry, a
reporter was held in contempt for violating an order prohibiting publica-
tion of any proceedings occurring in the absence of the jury. The court
held that the order could be collaterally attacked because it was void on its
face, not merely erroneous, and reversed the conviction. 55
3. Voluntary Guidelines for the Press
The promulgation of media codes of conduct concerning crimes and
publicity began in the 1960's. Much of the impetus for the movement to
devise voluntary guidelines came from the Warren Commission's Report
be challenged on constitutional grounds. Id. at 315. See also United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d
496 (5th Cir. 1972) (order prohibiting reporting of evidence taken at hearing held invalid: case re-
manded to determine appropriateness of contempt in light of order's unconstitutionality); on remand.
349 F. Supp. 227 (M.D. La. 1972) (collateral bar rule applied to uphold criminal contempt judg-
ment), appeal after remand, 476 F.2d 373 (5th Cir.) (law of the case applied in affirming district
court), cert. denied. 414 U.S. 979 (1973). Cf. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (ordinance
requiring permit to distribute literature void on its face; appellant need not seek permit before chal-
lenging ordinance).
The scope of the collateral bar rule enunciated in Walker is uncertain. While the Court has reaf-
firmed the Walker holding, violators of court orders have successfully raised constitutional defenses
in contempt proceedings. Compare Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308, 316 n.15
(1980) (injunction must be obeyed even if film is later found to be nonobscene) and GTE Sylvania.
Inc. v. Consumers Union, 445 U.S. 375, 386 (1980) (injunction issued by a court with jurisdiction
must be obeyed until modified or reversed, even if proper grounds to object exist) with Maness v.
Meyers, 419 U.S. 449 (1975) (privilege against self-incrimination raised in contempt proceeding
following violation of court order to produce evidence) and Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665
(1972) (first amendment defense raised in contempt proceeding following violation of court order to
testify). See Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 MINN L. REV 11.
21-22 (198 1); see also Barnett, The Puzzle of Prior Restraint. 29 STAN. L. REV. 539. 551-58 (1977)
(discussing collateral bar rule).
54. 79 Wn. 2d 69,483 P.2d 608, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971). See Wood v. Goodson, 253
Ark. 196, 485 S.W.2d 213 (1972); State v. Morrow, 57 Ohio App. 30, 11 N.E.2d 273 (1937). See
also Board of Medical Examiners v. Terminal-Hudson Electronics, Inc., 73 Cal. App. 3d 376, 140
Cal. Rptr. 757 (1977) (collateral bar rule inapplicable when court issuing order lacks jurisdiction):
Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court, 101 Ariz. 257, 418 P.2d 594 (1966) (collateral bar rule
inapplicable if court lacks jurisdiction or if order is void). Cf. Cooper v. Rockford Newspapers, Inc.,
50 I11. App. 3d 250, 365 N.E.2d 746 (1977) (collateral bar rule held inapplicable because first
amendment rights involved and speech posed no actual or imminent threat to the administration of
justice).
55. 79Wn.2dat74,483P.2dat61I.
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on the Assassination of President Kennedy. 56 The Commission concluded
that media coverage of the assassination would have jeopardized Lee Har-
vey Oswald's right to an impartial jury. 57 The Commission called on the
media and bar to devise standards to control dissemination of potentially
prejudicial publicity. 58
The Bench-Bar-Press Guidelines of Washington are a voluntary code 59
promulgated by a committee consisting of representatives of the judici-
ary, the bar, law enforcement, the media, and the University of Washing-
ton School of Communications. 60 The Guidelines cover criminal, grand
jury, juvenile, and civil proceedings. They contain a preamble and state-
ment of principles emphasizing the media's responsibility to. disseminate
accurate information, the need to preserve the right to an impartial jury,
and the responsibility of the bench, bar, and press to assure these goals. 6'
The guidelines for reporting criminal proceedings note that the impact
56. OFFICIAL WARREN COMMISSION REPORT ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KEN-
NEDY 239-40 (1964), quoted in A. FRIENDLY & R. GOLDFARB, CRIME AND PUBLICITY 316-17 (1967).
57. Id.
58. The American Bar Association adopted these standards in 1968. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIA-
TION PROJECr ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL
AND FREE PRESS (Approved Draft, 1968). The committee responsible for developing the standards
proposed rules restricting the dissemination of information by attorneys, controlling the release of
information by law enforcemeiit personnel, improving courtroom procedures to counteract prejudi-
cial publicity, and imposing contempt sanctions for intentional media interference with jury trials.
The committee recommended limited use of contempt power in cases involving the dissemination of
information by an individual who knows a criminal trial is in progress and publishes a statement
"wilfully designed by that person to affect the outcome of the trial" that "seriously threatens to have
such an effect." Id. § 4.1. The committee also recommended the use of the contempt power where
information is improperly disseminated by law enforcement personnel and judicial employees. Id. §§
2.1, 2.3. The ABA standards have since been revised. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDING COM-
MItrEE ON ASSOCIATION COMMUNICATIONS, THE RIGHTS OF FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS: THE AMERI-
CAN BAR ASSOiCIATION STANDARDS app. I (1981). The new standards recommend the use of the con-
tempt power against a person who, knowing a criminal jury trial is in progress or that a jury is being
selected, publishes a statement which "(i) is beyond the public record of the court; (ii) is intended by
that person to influence the jury's determination of guilt or innocence; and (iii) creates a clear and
present danger of having that effect." Id., Standard 8-4.1. The contempt power may also be used
when a person "knowingly violates a valid judicial order not to disseminate specified information"
referred to in a sealed record or a closed judicial proceeding. Id. If a representative of the news media
receives information through the misconduct of another, the representative will not be subject to
contempt for the dissemination of the information. Id., Standard 8-4.2.
59. The Guidelines do not have the force of law. State v. Stiltner, 80 Wn. 2d 47, 52, 491 P.2d
1043, 1046 (1971) (dictum); Federated Publications, Inc. v. Swedberg, 96 Wn. 2d 13, 21, 633 P.2d
74, 78 (1981) (dictum). See also State v. Allen, 73 N.J. 132, 373 A.2d 377, 381 (1977) (New
Jersey's Statement of Principles and Guidelines for the Reporting of Criminal Procedures has no
binding effect).
60. BENcH-BAR-PRESS GUIDELINES, supra note 4, at 1. The Guidelines are representative of simi-
lar codes promulgated in other states. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539,
613-17 (1976) (setting out Nebraska Bar-Press Guidelines for Disclosure and Reporting of Informa-
tion Relating to Imminent or Pending Criminal Litigation).
61. BENCH-BAR-PRESS GUIDELINES, supra note 4, at 2-3.
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of prejudicial publicity is greatest at the pretrial stage. 62 Information con-
sidered "appropriate" for publication includes the defendant's name, bi-
ographical facts, the substance of the charge, and the "circumstances im-
mediately surrounding an arrest." ' 63 Although information derived from
open judicial proceedings can be freely reported, publishers are to con-
sider the dangers of prejudice in disclosing before-trial information that
"tends to create dangers of prejudice without serving a significant law
enforcement or public interest function." 64
II. THE OPINION OF THE COURT
The Swedberg court held that the trial judge's order did not constitute a
prior restraint on freedom of expression because "[t]here was no prohibi-
tion of publication or other communication of events which transpired in
the courtroom."- 65 The court relied on its earlier decision in Federated
Publications, Inc. v. Kurtz, 66 which held that the public has a qualified
right of access to pretrial hearings under the state constitution's adminis-
tration of justice clause. 67 Under Kurtz, the trial court may order closure
if an open hearing is reasonably likely to prejudice the defendant's right
to a fair trial and no available or acceptable alternatives to closure exist. 68
The majority in Swedberg discussed several alternatives to closing the
hearing or imposing conditions on press attendance: continuance, sever-
ance, change of venue or venire, voir dire, peremptory challenges, jury
sequestration and jury admonitions. 69 The majority found these proposals
inadequate. 70
62. Id. at 3.
63. Id. at 4.
64. Id. at4-5.
65. Federated Publications, Inc. v. Swedberg, 96 Wn. 2d 13, 19, 633 P.2d 74, 77 (1981). cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 2257 (1982).
66. 94 Wn. 2d 51, 615 P.2d 440 (1980). See text accompanying notes 26-27 supra.
67. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 10. See note 35 and text accompanying notes 34-42 supra.
68. Kurtz, 94 Wn. 2d at 62-64, 615 P.2d at 446-47.
69. Swedberg, 96 Wn. 2d at 16-17,633 P.2d at 75.
70. Id. at 17-18, 633 P.2d at 75-76. The court stated why it believed the alternatives were
inadequate. A continuance would delay the trial, interfering with the accused's right to a speedy trial
and with the public's interest in the expeditious administration of justice. Severance is an available
alternative only when there is more than one defendant. A change of venue requires the defendant to
waive the right to be tried by a jury in the district where the offense occurred. A change of venire is
often unlikely to yield a jury which has not been exposed to publicity. Intensive voir dire may be
effective in revealing juror bias, but there remains the possibility that jurors may be unaware of or
unwilling openly to admit their biases. In addition, intensive voir dire may create jury resentment
toward the client of the attorney who pursues it. Sequestration is an ineffective remedy for pretrial
publicity because the jury has not yet been impaneled. Finally, jury instructions may emphasize to the
jurors the very prejudicial publicity they are admonished to disregard. Id.
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The court reasoned that the trial judge's power under Kurtz to close the
hearing, absent acceptable alternatives, included the power to "impose
reasonable conditions upon attendance." 71 In Swedberg, the trial judge
found that only closing the hearing or conditioning attendance upon the
signing of the agreement effectively protected the defendant's rights. The
court found further support for the condition by characterizing it as a rea-
sonable " 'time, place, and manner' " restriction on access to judicial
proceedings. 72 Although the court did not decide whether a violation of
the order would result in contempt, it emphasized that the Bench-Bar-
Press Guidelines represented a "nonobligatory" moral commitment "not
enforceable in a court of law. ',73
Four justices dissented, arguing that the trial court's order constituted a
prior restraint. 74 Writing for the dissenters, Justice Dolliver noted that the
trial judge made only "conclusory statements" when weighing the com-
peting interests of the public and the defendant. 75 The dissent concluded
that the trial judge therefore failed to meet both the closure requirements
set forth in Kurtz and the burden of justification for a prior restraint.
III. ANALYSIS
The Swedberg majority analyzed the trial court's order as a restriction
on access to the courtroom. They upheld this restriction as a permissible
limitation on access under Kurtz.76 The dissent, in contrast, characterized
the order as a prior restraint restricting the use of information obtained
during the pretrial hearing. 77
This section argues that the trial court's order fails under either an ac-
cess restriction or prior restraint analysis, and argues that the order is un-
constitutionally vague. It concludes that the Washington Supreme Court's
resolution of the issue is self-contradictory and forces the media to relin-
quish the protection traditionally accorded to use of information in order
to gain access to proceedings. It suggests, instead, an alternative ap-
proach that incorporates the guidelines set forth in Seattle Times Co. v.
Ishikawa.78
71. Id. at 22, 633 P.2d at 78 (quoting Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555,
581 n.18 (1980)).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 21-22, 633 P.2d at 78.
74. Id. at 26, 633 P.2d at 81 (Dolliver, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 28, 633 P.2d at 82.
76.. Svedberg, 96 Wn. 2d at 23, 633 P.2d at 78.
77. Id. at 27, 633 P.2d at 81 (Dolliver, J., dissenting).
78. 97 Wn. 2d 30, 640 P.2d 716 (1982).
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A. The Legality of the Trial Court's Order
1. The Trial Court's Order as an Access Restriction
Even if one accepts the Swedberg court's characterization of the trial
court order as an access restriction, the order failed to meet the criteria
articulated in Federated Publications, Inc. v. Kurtz.79 Under Kurtz, the
trial judge must weigh the competing interests of the defendant and the
public. The trial judge in Kurtz issued findings concerning the prejudicial
nature of the evidence sought to be suppressed, the prior publication of
prejudicial ballistics evidence, and the newspaper circulation in the
county where the trial was held. 80 In Swedberg, however, the trial judge
made no such findings. 81 The majority stated that "[t]he trial judge un-
doubtedly had . . . in mind" the problems involved in using alterna-
tives such as continuance and jury admonitions. 82 This statement was un-
founded. Judge Swedberg made no findings regarding these alternatives
and failed to weigh properly the competing interests of the defendant and
the public.
Factual findings help assure reasoned decisionmaking. The Kurtz court
emphasized the careful analysis that the trial judge had employed before
deciding to close the hearing. Because the Swedberg court held that the
power to close the hearing includes the power to impose reasonable con-
ditions, it should have required the trial judge to support his order with
factual findings. The Swedberg court's failure to require factual findings
encourages the arbitrary exercise of this power.
In addition, the Swedberg court's characterization of the condition as a
valid time, place, and manner restriction 83 was erroneous. The court re-
lied on Chief Justice Burger's statement in Richmond Newspapers that
79. 94 Wn. 2d 51, 615 P.2d 440 (1980). The procedure for issuing orders restricting access to
proceedings was restated in Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa, 97 Wn. 2d 30, 640 P.2d 716 (1982). See
notes 34-40 and accompanying text supra. Arguably, Ishikawa mitigates the effect of Swedberg by
requiring the trial judge to consider alternatives and articulate findings when deciding whether to
enter a restrictive order. Id. at 37-39, 640 P.2d at 720-21. See Miletich, Courts. Media Clash over
Criminal Trial Publicity, Seattle Post-intelligencer, Mar. 21. 1982, at B8, col. 6. Subsequent to the
Ishikawa decision, however, Swedberg's effect was evidenced by a motion for a Swedberg-type order
in the Charles Campbell murder case. Johnston, News Curbs to be Asked in Campbell Murder Trial.
Seattle Times, May 26, 1982, at B 1, col. 8. The motion was denied but the judge stated that if it was
later shown that the Bench-Bar-Press Guidelines were being violated, he would not "'hesitate to issue
such an order." Johnston, Judge in Clearview Murder Trial Disallows Press Curbs, Seattle Times.
May 28, 1982, at A22, col. 2.
80. Kurtz, 94 Wn. 2d at 62-65, 615 P.2d at 440.
81. "'IT]here is nothing in the record, nor an allegation or showing to the trial judge, that any of
the news coverage of the case had been or was likely to become sensational in nature . Swed-
berg, 96 Wn. 2d at 27, 633 P.2d at 82 (Dolliver, J., dissenting).
82. 96Wn.2dat 18, 633 P.2d at 76.
83. Id. at 22,633 P.2d at 78.
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reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions may be used by the trial
judge to limit access to trials. 84 The Swedberg court incorrectly inter-
preted this statement and misapplied the time, place, and manner doc-
trine. Acceptable restrictions contemplated by the Chief Justice are those
preserving the order and quiet of the courtroom.8 5 Valid time, place, and
manner restrictions may not be based on thecontent of the speech. 86 Be-
cause the Guidelines refer to types of communication, 87 the condition was
not a valid access limitation.
2. The Trial Court's Order as a Prior Restraint
The Swedberg dissent correctly labeled the trial court order as a prior
restraint. The form and effect of the agreement presented by the trial court
contradicts the majority's assertion that there was no prior restraint. 88 The
form stated, in part, "I agree to follow the Bench-Bar-Press Guidelines in
any reporting of the proceedings. . . . I am authorized to bind my news
agency to follow the Bench-Bar-Press Guidelines." ' 89 An agreement
which "binds" the signatory, incorporated into a court order, creates a
legal obligation. It is not merely a voluntary, moral pact.
This legal obligation constitutes a prior restraint because it is a govern-
ment order attempting to control the publication of disclosures made dur-
ing otherwise open judicial proceedings. The content of the legal duty
created by the order is determined by the Guidelines. For example, the
84. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581 n.18 (1980) (Burger, C.J., plu-
rality opinion). The Swedberg court incorrectly attributed this statement to Justice White. 96 Wn. 2d
at 22, 633 P.2d at 78.
85. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581 n. 18. For example, one case cited by Chief Justice
Burger was Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970), which emphasized the importance of maintaining
decorum in the courtroom. Id. at 346. The Chief Justice also noted that courtroom space limitations
may require the provision of preferential seating for the media. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at
581 n. 18. Justices Brennan and Stewart also acknowledged the need to maintain decorum. Id. at 598,
600. See also Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 102 S. Ct. 2613, 2620 n. 17 (1982) (strict
scrutiny inapplicable to time, place, and manner restrictions).
86. E.g., Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 648 (1981); Consoli-
dated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980). Other considerations in
evaluating time, place, and manner restrictions include: (1) whether the restriction vests arbitrary
authority in the government, creating the possibility of discrimination, see Shuttlesworth v. Birming-
ham, 394 U.S. 147, 153 (1969); (2) whether the restriction leaves open adequate alternative channels
of communication, Heffron, 452 U.S. at 648 (1981); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976); (3) whether the expression is compati-
ble with the normal activity of the area, Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 75
(1981); Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116-17 (1972); and (4) whether the state interest as-
serted is sufficiently important to justify the imposition on free speech, Heffron, 452 U.S. at 649.
87. See, e.g., text accompanying note 63 supra.
88. "There was no prohibition of publication . . .of events which transpired in the court-
room." Federated Publications, Inc. v. Swedberg, 96 Wn. 2d 13, 19, 633 P.2d 74, 77 (1981).
89. See id. at 26-27, 633 P.2d at 81.
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Guidelines state that "[t]he release of certain types of information [in-
cluding ballistics test results] tends to create dangers of prejudice without
serving a significant law enforcement or public interest function." 90 In
Federated Publications, Inc. v. Kurtz,9 1 the court noted that the trial
judge had found that the petitioning newspaper had twice violated the
Guidelines by publishing ballistics evidence after an express request from
the court to refrain. 92 A reporter looking to the Kurtz decision for guid-
ance in interpreting Judge Swedberg's order reasonably might conclude
that publication of information encompassed by the Guidelines' category
of "tending to create dangers of prejudice" would violate the order and
lead to a contempt citation. 93 Because the order restricted publication of
information in the media's control, its validity should have been tested
under the Nebraska Press94 rule.
Under the Nebraska Press rule, the trial court order was unconstitu-
tional. Although the test adopted by the Supreme Court in Nebraska
Press is widely thought to represent the low point in first amendment pro-
tection, 95 its application by Chief Justice Burger severely limits the situa-
tions in which restrictive orders will be upheld. 96 The Swedberg court
only superficially considered the factors Burger used in applying the
test.97
The first factor to be examined under the Nebraska Press test is the
nature and extent of pretrial publicity. The court in Swedberg accepted
90. BENCH-BAR-PRESS GUIDELINES. supra note 4, at 4-5.
91. 94 Wn. 2d 51, 615 P.2d 440 (1980).
92. Id. at 63,615 P.2d at 446-47.
93. The reporter is well advised either to refrain from publication or to attack the order directly.
Because it is impossible to predict whether a court will hold the order to be void on its face. merely
erroneous, or valid, the reporter cannot know whether constitutional defenses will be lost if the order
is collaterally attacked. See text accompanying notes 54-55 supra (discussing collateral bar rule in
Washington).
94. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). See notes 43-51 and accompanying
text supra (discussing Nebraska Press).
95. The - 'sliding scale'/clear and present danger standard" is "notoriously amorphous" and
was originally developed in subsequent punishment cases. Schmidt, Nebraska Press Association: An
Expansion of Freedom and Contraction of Theory, 29 STAN L. REV 431. 459-60 (1977). See also
T. EMERSON. THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION 114-15 (1970).
96. Some commentators argue that the Nebraska Press decision outlaws any prior restraints in
the fair trial context because the nature and extent of pretrial publicity can never be proven, a finding
of no available alternatives is difficult to reach, and a prior restraint order is ineffective because it
fails to bind media organizations outside the court's jurisdiction. Goodale, The Press Ungagged: The
Practical Effect on Gag Order Litigation of Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 29 STAN L. REv
497, 497-503 (1977). This argument is questionable in light of the analytical differences between the
opinions of Justices Burger and Brennan in Nebraska Press. Although Burger indicated that a restric-
tive order might be constitutional in some fair trial situations, 427 U.S. at 558, Brennan argued that a
prior restraint is never appropriate in such cases. Id. at 572-73 (Brennan. J., concurring in the judg-
ment).
97. See text accompanying note 49 supra (listing factors).
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without question the trial judge's assertion that" 'the likelihood of jeop-
ardy to a fair trial is overwhelmingly established.' -98 The assumption
that publicity is prejudicial is necessarily speculative and, as the dissent
notes, "nothing in the record" supports the trial judge's conclusion. 99
The court's treatment of the second factor, the effectiveness of alterna-
tives, is inadequate and provides little guidance for trial judges. '00 Al-
though these alternatives may have drawbacks, they can be effectively
used in many situations to protect the defendant's rights. 101 In Nebraska
Press, the United States Supreme Court noted that the Nebraska trial
court had made no findings concerning the efficacy of alternatives and
stated that such alternatives are favored. 102 This statement, combined
with the necessarily speculative nature of any finding that the alternatives
would not work, indicates that alternatives should be tried before a re-
strictive order is issued. 103 The Washington court's preference for the im-
position of "reasonable conditions" on attendance, and its speculative
dismissal of the effectiveness of other alternatives, may encourage trial
judges to ignore or discount the alternatives as a viable means of protect-
ing against prejudicial publicity.
The third prong of the Nebraska Press test requires the court to deter-
mine whether the restrictive order sought would effectively prevent the
threatened danger. 104 Like the extent of the publicity, the effectiveness of
the order in preventing harm was speculative. The order applied only to
the members of the media, and only to those members acting in a profes-
sional capacity. 105 Because any member of the general public could have
98. 96 Wn. 2d at 28, 633 P.2d at 82 (Dolliver, J., dissenting) (quoting the trial court).
99. Id. at 27, 633 P.2d at 82 (Dolliver, J., dissenting).
100. See note 70 supra.
101. It is difficult to imagine a case involving greater prejudicial publicity than Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966), yet the Supreme Court stated there that such alternatives would have
been sufficient to protect Sheppard's rights. Id. at 363.
102. 427 U.S. 539,563-66 (1976).
103. Indeed, one scholar believes that the "Supreme Court's apparent confidence that the alter-
natives would prove adequate suggests that the Court has gone further and announced a virtual bar to
prior restraints on reporting of news about crime." L. TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-
11, at 627 (1978); see also Prettyman, Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart: Have We Seen the Last
ofPrior Restraints on the Reporting of Judicial Proceedings?, 20 ST. Louis L.J. 654, 658 (intention
of Nebraska Press Court was to require the use of alternatives other than prior restraints) (1976).
Courts may also attempt to use innovative alternatives in a case involving prejudicial publicity. See
Commonwealth v. Hayes, 489 Pa. 419, 414 A.2d 318, 324 (supporting sequestration of jury before
pretrial hearing), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 992 (1980).
104. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562 (1976).
105. Swedberg, 96 Wn. 2d at 15, 633 P.2d at 74. See Chief Justice Burger's discussion in First
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 797-802 (1978), regarding the significance of
the Press Clause. The Chief Justice stated that the Press Clause conferred no "special status to a
limited group," noting the definitional problems involved in determining what institutions would be
considered "Press." Id. at 801.
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attended the hearing and reported the events to a newspaper, the order
could be easily circumvented. Thus, the order fails to satisfy the Ne-
braska Press test and fails to overcome the heavy presumption against the
constitutional validity of a prior restraint. 106
3. The Trial Court's Use of the Bench-Bar-Press Guidelines
Even assuming that some type of constitutional gag order could have
been issued, the trial court's order incorporating the Guidelines was un-
constitutionally vague. The void-for-vagueness doctrine invalidates laws
that lack sufficient clarity to provide the notice required by the due pro-
cess clause. 107 Because the Bench-Bar-Press Guidelines were designed as
voluntary rules, they purposefully lack the specificity of mandatory stat-
utes or regulations. The statement that "the publication of [certain] infor-
mation should be carefully reviewed" 108 fails to give a precise indication
of either the prohibition or the consequences of publication.
In Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, Justice Blackmun stayed the
portion of the order that incorporated the Nebraska Bar-Press Guide-
lines. 10 9 He described the Guidelines as "vague and indefinite." and
stated that they failed to provide "the substance of a permissible court
order in the First Amendment area." "10 Judge Swedberg's order was sim-
ilarly unsatisfactory.
B. The Ramifications of Swedberg: The Resulting Use-Access Tradeoff
In Swedberg, the Washington Supreme Court significantly reduced the
right of access to criminal trials. The court recognized the right of the
press to attend the proceeding, but granted that right only if the press
agreed to curtail its use of the information divulged. Because the court
106. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 558 (1976). See notes 43-47 and accompa-
nying text supra (discussing presumption against prior restraint).
107. U.S. CONST. amend. V: U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See generally Amsterdam. The Void-
for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv 67 (1960) (overview of the void-
for-vagueness doctrine).
108. BENCH-BAR-PRESS GUIDELINES, supra note 4, at 5.
109. 423 U.S. 1327, 1330-31 (1975). Justice Blackmun reviewed the district court's restrictive
order in his capacity as a Circuit Justice. Id.
110. Id. at 1331. For example, the Nebraska Bar-Press Guidelines state that "lilt is appropriate
to disclose and report the following information: I. The arrested person's name, age, residence.
employment, marital status and similar biographical information." Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart,
427 US. 539, 614 (1976). The Washington Guidelines list the identical information as "appropriate
to make public." BENCIt-BAR-PRESS GUIDLINES, supra note 4, at 4. The general structures of the
guidelines in Washington and Nebraska are substantially similar.
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cannot restrain the use of information in this context, "'1 it was forced to
characterize the restriction as one on access. Forcing the press to trade its
right to use information as it chooses for access to court proceedings is
unacceptable. It infringes free speech without necessarily safeguarding
the defendant's right to a fair trial.
This tradeoff fails to safeguard the defendant's right to a fair trial for
two reasons. First, the Swedberg approach is self-contradictory. Al-
though it approved incorporating the Bench-Bar-Press Guidelines into a
court order, the court indicated in dictum that it probably would not have
held the newspaper in contempt for violating the order, noting that con-
tempt in this situation would "be contrary to the spirit and intent of the
Bench-Bar-Press Guidelines." 112 This is consistent with the court's inter-
pretation of the agreement as voluntary, but ignores the media's inability
to predict this result. Because publication probably would not result in
contempt, the trial court's order is unenforceable and cannot prevent the
publication of prejudicial publicity. The Swedberg decision, upholding
such an ineffectual order, only increases the antagonism between the
media and the bench, a result the Guidelines seek to avoid. 113
Second, the order could be easily circumvented because it applied only
to reporters acting in their professional capacity. The professional/non-
professional dichotomy is a highly questionable categorization, 114 and it
also fails to force compliance with the Guidelines. 115 Thus, the tradeoff
imposed by Swedberg contradicts first amendment principles and is inef-
fectual.
C. An Alternative Approach
Trial court orders that restrict the use of information from open court
111. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 568 (1976). See note I 1 supra (listing cases
holding that restrictions may not be imposed on information divulged in open court).
112. 96 Wn. 2d at 21-22,633 P.2d at 78.
113. The adoption of the Bench-Bar-Press Guidelines by Washington was considered progres-
sive. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS 29 (1967). Following the Sivedberg decision,
the Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Allied Daily Newspapers, Washington Newspaper Publishers Associa-
tion, and Washington State Association of Broadcasters withdrew their formal support for the Guide-
lines. The Post-Intelligencer and Allied Daily Newspapers issued statements that their withdrawal
was not a repudiation of the spirit and substance of the guidelines but a reaction to the prior restraint
upheld in Swedberg. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Apr. 23, 1982, at Bl2, col. 1. The Bench-Bar-Press
Committee has asked Donald Pember, a University of Washington communications professor, to
draft new principles omitting the word "guidelines" and stressing their voluntary nature. Miletich,
Courts, Media Clash Over Criminal Trial Publicity, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Mar. 21, 1982, at B8,
col. I.
114. See note 105 supra (press entitled to no greater rights than public).
115. See text accompanying notes 105-06 supra.
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proceedings should be rejected as prior restraints. Although prior restraint
analysis may be criticized,] 16 the prior restraint approach protects the
press and should be applied to invalidate such orders. The collateral bar
rule also should be rejected in this context. 117 The media should not lose
constitutional defenses simply because a court finds an order erroneous
rather than void on its face.
Courts should close proceedings only in limited circumstances, and
only after carefully evaluating the alternatives. Because prior restraints
are generally unconstitutional, closure orders may be the only means of
assuring that prejudicial information will not reach and perhaps unalter-
ably affect potential jurors. Closure, however, is in many ways the equiv-
alent of a prior restraint. Procedurally, closure may be equivalent because
an exclusionary order is often entered without procedural safeguards and,
under the collateral bar rule, is enforceable by a subsequent contempt pro-
ceeding without regard to the merits of the order. Substantively, closure
is equivalent to a prior restraint because the exclusionary order limits the
dissemination of information. 118 Thus, closure orders may be as offensive
as prior restraints. The use of closure orders should be severely limited.
The Washington Supreme Court recently recognized the need for a
careful evaluation of the alternatives to closure in Seattle Times Co. v.
Ishikawa.119 This case may indicate a welcome movement towards a
more thorough treatment of alternatives. The ultimate responsibility for
protecting the defendant's right to a fair trial lies with the trial judge. The
trial judge may find, in some circumstances, that only closure will protect
116. See Barnett, supra note 53. Professor Barnett argues that the doctrine of prior restraint is
undermined when the collateral bar rule does not apply. Id. at 557. Arguably, a gag order has a
greater deterrent impact than a subsequent punishment only because the violator "'may be assured of
being held in contempt." A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 61 (1975). If the collateral bar rule
is inapplicable, the press does not lose its constitutional defenses by disobeying the order, and the
inhibition on speech is the same as in a subsequent punishment case. Barnett, supra note 53, at 557.
See also Rendleman, Restrictive Orders after Nebraska Press, 67 Ky. L.J. 775, 897-98 (1978-79)
(the"prior restraint" label allows courts to use the doctrine as a "subterfuge to decide in favor of
particular speech without adjudicating whether parallel civil or criminal law is valid" and to "manip-
ulate results by affixing labels"). But see Blasi, supra note 53. Blasi argues that the presumption
against prior restraints is supportable even in the absence of the collateral bar rule. Id. at 69-85.
117. See discussion at § 1B2 supra. Allowing collateral attack in these situations is important
because restrictive orders are often issued immediately before the planned publication, leaving the
enjoined party with no adequate remedy. State ex rel. Superior Court v. Sperry, 79 Wn. 2d 69. 74,
483 P.2d 608, 611, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971). Allowing collateral attack will not signifi-
cantly reduce compliance with lawful orders because the publisher "still faces a substantial risk of
criminal penalties if proved wrong in collateral, rather than direct, attack on the decree's validity."
Id. (quoting Note, Defiance of Unlawful Authority, 83 HARV. L. REV. 626, 635 (1970)). See also In
re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 184 n. 15 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (critique of collateral bar rule).
118. See generally 2 J. CHOPER, Y. KAMISAR & L. TRIBE, supra note 27, at 184-89 (discussing
distinction between prior restraints and exclusionary orders).
119. 97Wn.2d30,640P.2d716(1982).
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the defendant's rights. Nevertheless, closure orders should not issue un-
less the court follows well defined procedures that provide the media an
opportunity to object, 120 and closure orders should be designed as nar-
rowly as possible to accomplish their purpose. 121 The trial judge should
carefully evaluate all possible alternatives. 122
IV. CONCLUSION
The problem faced by the trial court in Swedberg is central to the fair
trial-free press conflict. The conflict has grown along with the recognition
of a public right to attend proceedings. In Swedberg, the Washington Su-
preme Court erroneously characterized a prior restraint as a reasonable
access restriction. The result increased the antagonism between the bench
and the media without necessarily increasing protection of the defen-
dant's right to a fair trial. After Swedberg, the court established pro-
cedures for trial courts to follow before shutting their doors to the press.
These procedures should be carefully followed. The right of access
should mean that the government, "even, perhaps, at some inconveni-
ence or cost to itself," 123 must take affirmative steps to protect both the
rights of the defendant and of the public.
Lynne Adrienne Chafetz
120. These procedures are set forth in Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa, 97 Wn. 2d at 37-39, 640
P.2d at 720-21. See also notes 37-42 and accompanying text supra (listing procedures).
121. Federated Publications, Inc. v. Kurtz, 94 Wn. 2d 51, 64, 615 P.2d 440,447 (1980).
122. Judges should not overlook the possibility of impanelling and sequestering the jury before
the pretrial hearing. See Commonwealth v. Hayes, 489 Pa. 419, 414 A.2d 318, 324, cert. denied,
449 U.S. 992 (1980). Although this alternative works a hardship on the jurors and is expensive, these
drawbacks should be balanced against the fact that prejudicial publicity poses a threat only in excep-
tional cases. Recently a King County Superior Court judge decided to select a jury prior to pretrial
hearings and permit the media to attend the hearings. Jury to be Selected Before Hearings in Murder
Case, Seattle Times, Oct. 5, 1982, at B2, col. 2.
123. 2 J. CHOPER, Y. KAMISAR & L. TRIBE, supra note 27, at 277.
